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IN THE SUPRErlli COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15278

-vsVERDEAN ILAS CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Respondent submits this supplemental brief on the
question relating to the Suppression Hearing transcript in
Point II because the Suppression Hearing transcript became
available to respondent only after submission of respondent's
brief (respondent's brief, p.l9).
Parenthetically, although not included in either
appellant's or respondent's Statement of Facts, respondent
notes that after the jury returned a verdict of guilty on
the first two counts against appellant, and was polled, the
appellant chose to waive his right to a jury determination
of the Habitual Criminal charge.

The trial court briefly

questioned appellant about the voluntariness of his waiver
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and found that he did voluntarily waive the jury for
purposes of the third count (Tr.200-201).
POINT II - ADDENDUM
The United States Supreme Court in Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 77 L.Ed. 993, 53 S.Ct. 465
(1932), addressed an abuse of juror privilege question.
The Court decided that a person who became a juror by
deliberately concealing a bias from the court and
with intent to thwart the prosecution,waived the
privilege against disclosure of that juror's conduct
in the jury room,which normally is privileged.

In

reaching this conclusion, the Court analogized privilege
to that of attorney and client:
"The privilege [between
attorney and client] takes flight
if the relation is abused. A
client who consults an attorney
for advice that will serve him
in the commission of a fraud
will have no help from the law.
He must let the truth be told.
There are early cases apparently
to the effect that a mere charge
of illegality, not supported by
the evidence, will set the
confidences free (authorities
omitted) • • • But this conception
of the privilege is without support
in later rulings.
'It is obvious
that it would be absurd to say
that the privilege could be got
rid of merely by making a charge
of fraud' • • . When that evidence
is supplied, the seal of secrecy
is broken." Id., 289 u.s. at 15.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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At the Suppression Hearing, appellant moved to
suppress the testimony of Mr. Van Sciver relating to the
contact appellant had had with him concerning the stolen
checks.

Mr. Van Sciver was called and testified in

substantially the same manner as he later did at trial
(Suppression Hearing Tr.4-8).

In argument against

appellant's motion, the prosecution sought to admit the
transcript of an earlier investigative hearing which was
convened to determine whether or not Mr. Van Sciver should
be required to divulge the name of his client.

In that

hearing before a different court, that court held no attorney-client relationship existed (Suppression Hearing
Tr.l8), and ordered Mr. Van Sciver to reveal his client's
name.

Although the court reserved ruling on the admissibility

of thisearliertranscript for purposes of appellant's
motion (Suppression Hearing Tr.21), it appears that the
court did not admit the transcript of the investigative
hearing as the court denied appellant's motion without
further reference to the transcript (Suppression Hearing
Tr.21-22).
Appellant now claims that because the only
evidence before the trial court on his motion to suppress
was Mr. Van Sciver's testimony, the standard of Clark v.
United States, supra, has not been met.

Appellant's

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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contention overlooks the independent existence of the
stolen checks themselves.

The Clark ruling was

intended to protect against the haphazard, erroneous,
and even malicious disclosure of otherwise privileged
communications.

No such danger was presented in this

case because the stolen checks were prima facie
evidence giving "colour to the charge."

Similarly,

Rule 26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, as discussed more fully in Respondent's Brief, necessitated
a similar showing of corroborative evidence; which was
amply supplied by the existence of the stolen checks.
Appellant's position is that these checks
did not indicate an ongoing crime but rather a past
one.

However, when Mr. Van Sciver told appellant that

this situation sounded like an extortion plot and the
appellant responded, "Well, it is," Mr. Van Sciver
was forced to make a decision how he should act.
With the stolen checks in front of him, together with
the appellant's instructions for him to call the owners,
give the owners the checks when they came and then
receive their money in return, Mr. Van Sciver quite
properly assessed this as an ongoing crime.

The
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checks corroborated the appellant's admission of the
extortion plan.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
15278

-vsVERDEAN !LAS CARTER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with one count of Theft
By Receiving, a felony of the second degree, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953), as

amended~

one count

of Attempted Theft By Extortion, a felony of the third
degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-406 (1953),
as amended; and with Being An Habitual Criminal, a felony
in the first degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-8-1001 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried on the first two counts:
Theft By Receiving and Attempted Theft By Extortion, before
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a jury and was found guilty on both counts on May 19,
1977, in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable
James S. Sawaya, presiding.

A separate hearing was held

to determine whether appellant was guilty of Count III on
June 8, 1977, at which time the trial court found appellant
guilty of Being An Habitual Criminal.

On June 8, 1977,

the trial court sentenced appellant to serve an indeterminate
term of not less than one nor more than fifteen years on
Count I; an indeterminate term of not more than five years
on Count II; and an indeterminate term of five years to life
on Count III; all sentences to be served at the Utah State
Prison and all sentences to run concurrently.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming ,
the judgment of the jury at the trial, the judgment of the

I

court on the hearing on Count III, and the sentences imposed
as a result of these judgments.
STATEl1ENT OF FACTS
Respondent feels that appellant has adequately
stated the facts of the case and would make only the
following corrections and additions:
1.

Mr. Ward believed that all three calls he

received were made by the same man (Tr.25,29).
2.

Mr. Nelson received the last call at 11:30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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p.m., February 28.

It was agreed as a result of this call

that delivery was to be made through an attorney (Tr.36}.
3.

The appellant first talked with Gilbert

Athay about his transaction, but eventually called Robert
Van Sciver because he could not contact Mr. Athay and
because Mr. Athay had run for Attorney General (Trl46}.
4.

When appellant went to Mr. Van Sciver's

office March 1st, he met Van Sciver in the waiting room
where Van Sciver had been standing with his associate,
Randall Gaither.

Mr. Gaither was "in and about the area"

while appellant told Van Sciver to call the person on the
checks, to expect someone bringing in money, and to give
the checks in exchange for the money (Tr.53,54}.
5.

Mr. VanSciver testified he knew the appellant

was alone because he saw appellant's car in the parking lot
(Tr.62}.
5.

Mr. Van Sciver was telling appellant he did

not like the setup, that it smelled, and so forth in the
presence of appellant, and Randall Gaither as they were
leaving his office (Tr.56,63,64}.
6.

Gerald Kinghorn testified that he could recall

only one prosecution since the Habitual Criminal Statute
was enacted (Tr.206}.
7.

The Habitual Criminal Statute was enacted in

May, 1975 (Tr.206).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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9.

Mr. Kinghorn testified that the policy of

the County Attorney was to use the Habitual Criminal Statute
whenever it could be used (Tr.208).
10.

The Career Criminal Unit uses seven criteria

to identify and prosecute individuals who qualify for Habitual
Criminal Status, and he listed most of those criteria (Tr.207)
11.

David E. Yocom testified that he reviewed rap 1.

sheets and investigations, and concluded only two out of
all those prosecuted under the program could have been chargee/·
and convicted of being habitual criminals (Tr.214,215,216,
217).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH'S HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN.
§

76-8-1001 (1953), AS AMENDED, IS CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND.
A.

THE STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE

AND NOT VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEED TO THE
STATES UNDER THE FOURTEENTH N1ENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OR OF UNIFORM OPERATION OF THE LAWS
PROVIDED IN ARTICLE 1, SECTION 24 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH.
After the appellant was found guilty on the first
two counts:

theft by receiving and attempted theft by

extortion, the trial court in a separate hearing found him
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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guilty of being an habitual criminal in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1953), as amended.

Being an

habitual criminal is a status offense, and the habitual
criminal statute will apply only upon a conviction of the
criminal offense last charged, Zeimer v. Turner, 14 Utah 2d
232, 381 P.2d 813 (1963).

Section 76-8-1001 reads as follows:

"Any person who has been twice
convicted, sentenced, and committed
for felony offenses at least one of
which offenses having been at least
a felony of the second degree or a crime
which, if committed within this state
would have been a capital felony, felony
of the first degree or felony of second
degree, and was committed to any prison
may, upon conviction of at least felony
of the second degree committed in this
state, other than murder in the first
or second degree, be determined as a
habitual criminal and be imprisoned in
the state prison for from five years to
life. • • • "
Appellant claims that the legislature's use of the word
"may" in the statute gives choice of enforcement which
discriminates against him in violation of his right to
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the constitution of the United States and
of his right to uniform operation of laws as provided in
Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah.

Habitual criminal statutes have been employed as

an exercise of police power by the states to protect the
public from persons whose criminal histories reveal criminal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization
the Institute
Library Services
propensity.
State
v. Wood,
2 Utahprovided
2d by34,
268of Museum
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1002 (1954).

A theshold question is whether the Fourteenth

Amendment to the Constitution of the United States applies
so as to restrict exercise of the police powers of the
state.

In State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah 1974),

this Court upheld a statute which made it an offense,
inter alia, for aliens to possess or control a dangerous
weapon.

In concluding that the statute did not violate

equal protection, the Court reasoned that the:
" • • • sale, use and possession
of firearms are proper subjects of
regulation by the State. The Fourteenth
Amendment is not generally applied so as
to restrict exercise of the police powers
of the State. The statute under
consideration was directed toward the
safeguarding of the public peace and
security and is thus a proper exercise
of the ~olice powers." Id. at 814, 815.
(Emphas1s added.).
Respondent submits, preliminarily, that like the statute
upheld in Beorchia, Section 76-8-1001 is directed toward
the safeguarding of the public peace and security, is a
proper exercise of police power, and therefore is not subject
to a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection attack.
Beyond this threshold issue, Utah's Habitual
Criminal statute withstands constitutional scrutiny under
both federal and state guidelines.

Generally, courts have

upheld habitual criminal statutes so long as they are
applied fairly, not discriminatorily enforced,and not
selected
byLawunjustifiable
standards.
InMuseum
Graham
West
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of
and Libraryv.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
OCR, may containthe
errors. United States Supreme
Virginia, 224 Machine-generated
616 (1912),

u.s.

Court considered a statute alleged to be arbitrarily
discriminatory.

In rejecting the claim, the Court gave

a limited reading to the Fourteenth Amendment:
"The Fourteenth Amendment is
not to be construed as 'introducing
a factitious equity without regard to
practical differences that are best
met by corresponding differences of
treatment • • • A State may make
different arrangements for trials
under different circumstances of even
the same class of offenses."
(See also
authorit~es cited therein.)
(Emphasis
added.)
The pre-eminent case of Oyler v. Boles, 368

u.s.

448 (1962), held that failure to proceed against other
offenders, all within the purview of 'an habitual criminal
statute, does not deny equal protection in the absence
of allegation and proof that enforcement selectivity was
based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion,
or other arbitrary classification.

In Oyler, the petitioner

provided statistical data indicating that 904 men known to
be offenders, were not sentenced as required by the statute.
Additionally, petitioner claimed that during a fifteen year
period six men sentenced to the same court were subject to
habitual offender prosecution, yet only he was actually
sentenced during this period.

In denying petitioner relief,

the Court held the evidence did not amount to a denial of
equal protection:
• • the conscious exercise
of some selectivity in enforcement
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is not in itself a federal constitutional violation. Even though the
statistics in this case might imply
a policy of selective enforcement, it
is not stated that the selection was
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification. Therefore grounds supporting a finding of a
denial of equal protection were not
alleged." Id. at 456.
Although Oyler did not specifically address the facial
constitutional issue, clearly it permitted enforcment
selectivity if that selectivity were not based on
impermissibe grounds.
Various states, however, have specifically
addressed the facial issue, generally permitting
prosecutorial discretion expressed in the statute.

In

State v. Troy, 215 Kan. 369, 524 P.2d 1121 (1974), the
defendant was sentenced as a second offender of second
degree burglary under the Kansas habitual criminal
statute.

He challenged its constitutionality on the

grounds it violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,

arguing that the

prosecuting attorney could dictate or control the sentence
by introducing or withholding evidence of previous
convictions.

This discretion, he claimed, was an

impermissible delegation of authority and was used unfairly
as prosecutorial leverage in plea bargaining.

The Kansas

Supreme Court held that the exercise of reasonable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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discretion in the application of the law to those of the
same class does not necessarily make the law unconstitutional
as depriving one of equal protection.

Further, the exercise

of discretion without a showing of discrimination does not
deprive one of due process or equal protection in a case
where an enhanced penalty was imposed.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nebraska in
State v. Martin, 190 Neb. 212, 206 N.W.2d 856 (1973),
rejected an equal protection attack on its habitual criminal
statute, emphasizing the inherent necessity of discretion.
Again, in State v. Anderson, 12 Wash.App. 171, 528
P.2d 1003 (1974), the defendant argued the Washington
habitual criminal statute provided insufficient safeguards
and standards for application of the statute and that it
permitted improper selective enforcement.

In rejecting his

claims, the court noted the defendant failed to make a
showing that the statute as applied to him was applied
on an "arbitrary and discriminatory basis so as to deny
defendant equal protection or due process of law."
528 P.2d at 1005.

Id.,

The court also ruled that there was no

unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

~-

Accord, Wilwording v. State, 438 S.W.2d 447, 449
(Mo. 1969).
In the case at bar, appellant relies exclusively
on State v. Cory, 204 Ore. 235, 282 P.2d 1054 (1955), in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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76-8-1001 makes the statute constitutionally infirm.
Admittedly, the Court in Cory struck down this wording
as giving the prosecution too much discretion.

However,

respondent submits that Cory, a 1955 case, goes against
the more recent weight of authority.
have h<d·,tu;

·1

crimin;c•l ,_,;

i

'.es

States which

'uthorizing

P"''~'ecutorial

discretion generally require the one charged thereunder
to show intentional or purposeful discrimination.
In the instant case, appellant has neither
alleged nor proved any intentional or purposeful discrimina·
tion.

Respondent submits the great weight of authority

approves statutorily authorized prosecutorial discretion
in the area of habitual criminal statute.

Express dis-

cretion is consonant with the practicalities of prosecution:
because these statutes generally include offenses in other

I

states which would be felonies in the home state necessitatin:l

I

prosecutorial leeway in determining the precise nature of
the offense,

the check on prosecutorial misconduct is

prohibition of discriminatory application based on
unjustifiable standards.
B.

THE STATUTE WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY APPLIED.

As discussed,
(1962)

~,

Oyler v. Boles, 368

u.s.

(and other authorities cited in Point IA), permit

some selectivity in enforcement of the habitual criminal
statutes, so long as the selectivity standards are not
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based on impermissible classifications such as race, religion
and so on.

Accord, State v. Deddens, 112 Ariz. 425, 542

P.2d 1124 (1975); People v. MacFarland, 540 P.2d 1073 (Colo.
1975); City of Minneapolis v. Buschette, 240 N.W.2d 500
(Minn. 1976).

Further, courts have heldthatconscious

selectivity in prosecution is not enough to make application
unconstitutional without a discriminatory showing.

State v.

Andrews,l65 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1969); Delaney v. Gladden, 397
F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 393

u.s.

1040.

In the case at bar, appellant has failed to show
any selectivity in applicationofthis statute, let alone any
impermissible selectivity.

In support of his motion to

dismiss the habitual criminal count, appellant's attorney
called Gerald Kinghorn, Assistant County Attorney, Salt Lake
County, who testified that since enactment of Section 76-8-1001
in May, 1975, to the date of the hearing, June 8, 1977, he could
recall prosecuting only one person under the statute:
appellant (Tr.203-206).

the

He testified the Career Criminal

Unit uses several criteria to determine qualification under
the statute (Tr.207), and that the policy of the County Attorney

is to use the statute "whenever it can be used,

whenever you

have access to all of the evidence that is necessary"(Tr.208).
Appellant's attorney also called the prosecutor, David E.
Yocom, Deputy County Attorney and head of the Career Criminal
Program, a federally assisted program organized to identify,
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categories (Tr.212,207).

Mr. Yocom testified that during

the 25 month period the statute had been in effect, two
individuals had been charged with being an habitual
criminal:

appellant and a William Langley. The charges

against Mr. Langley were later dropped (Tr.213).

He

further testified that out of the approximately 260
defendants who had been prosecuted under the program
(Tr.213), no persons other than appellant and Langley
could have been charged and successfully convicted under
the statute (Tr.213,214,215,216).

He explained that it

is sometimes difficult to ascertain what degree of
felony an out-of-state conviction would be in the State
of Utah (Tr.216,219).
Appellant was unable to elicit testimony or any
other evidence in support of his motion indicating
discriminatory selectivity based on unjustifiable standards.
Nor did he allege an unjustifiable standard such as those
mentioned in Oyler v. Boles, supra.
cites Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118

u.s.

In his brief, appellant
356 (1886), in support of

his argument, but Yick Wo prohibited discriminatory law
enforcement against Chinese owned and operated laundries
thereby coming under the invidious classification of race.
Appellant does not allege or prove he was discriminated
against because he comes within any such classification.
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Other cases relied upon by appellant which
he claims allow him relief are not directly in point.
United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972);
and United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir.
1972), are all First Amendment cases.
Falk,

~'

In United States v.

the appellant claimed he had been selected

for prosecution not for violation of the law but for
punishment of his participation in a draft counseling
organization.

The trial court had refused an evidentiary

hearing on his motion.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals

reversed, emphasizing the possible chilling effect on
First Amendment rights.
Appellant also claimed First Amendment infringement in United States v. Steele, supra.

His conviction

was reversed after the court determined the record did
not support the government's contention the appellant's
prosecution was not selective.

Although the census official

testified that to the best of his recollection only
Steele and his three codefendants had refused to cooperate,
Steele introduced six other individuals, not prosecuted, who
had refused to complete the census forms, but had done so
privately.
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Finally, in United States v. Crowthers, supra,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that where the
Pentagon had authorized use of a public concourse for
religious, recreational and awards assemblies on numerous
occasions, it could not prosecute participants in an
unauthorized "Mass for Peace."

It also ruled that the

regulation prohibiting all distribution of leaflets, etc.,
without prior approval of an authorized official was an
unconstitutional First Amendment infringement, noting
that the prosecutorial selectivity was plainly grounded
on governmental disagreement with the ideas expressed by
the accused.
Several factors distinguish the present case.
First, no First Amendment rights are involved.

Second,

the record does not establish that the appellant was
singled out for arbitrary, intentional, or purposeful
discrimination.

Third, appellant introduced no evidence

that would justify his claim of intentional or purposeful
discriminatory prosecution.
The defendant in State v. Baldondo, 78 N.M.
175, 441 P.2d 215 (1968), made a very similar argument to
that advanced by appellant in the instant case.

Baldondo

argued that the prosecutorial policy of non-enforcement

-14-
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of out-of-state offenders violated his equal protection
rights.

In rejecting this claim, the Court concluded the

statute applied equally to members of the same class:
"The fact that the statute
may not be enforced diligently, does
not give rise to a right which
would amount to a denial of equal
protection.
The allegation of a 'consistent
and invariable administrative practice,'
in no:t enforcing the law with respect
to habitual offenders uniformly, does
not bring this case within the purview
of the equal protection clause of the
constitution." Id., 441 P.2d at 216, 217.
See State v. Judd, 27 Utah 2d 79, 493 P.2d 604 (1972), wherein
this Court held an alleged putative father was not denied
equal protection of laws when an action against him was
initiated under a procedure criminal in form, although other
putative fathers similarly situated were served by less
severe civil process.
Respondent submits no showing exists of any
impermissible application of the habitual criminal statute.
C.· UTAH'S HABITUAL CRIMINAL STATUTE IS A
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY
THE LEGISLATURE.
The 1975 Legislature enacted Section 76-8-1001 and
1002.

Section 76-8-1001 authorizes some prosecutorial

discretion in its enforcement by the inclusion of the
word "may".

Appellant feels this legislative authorization
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constitutes an impermissible delegation of authority and
because the habitual criminal statute is an enhancement
of punishment and not a crime in itself, discretion as
to its application amounts to executive branch encroachment on a strictly legislative prerogative.

In reliance

thereon, appellant cites State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683
(Utah 1977), in which this Court ruled that "elements
of a crime and the appropriate punishment therefor are,
under our Constitutional system, judgments, which must be
determined exclusively by the legislature."

Id. at 690.

Respondent does not dispute this reading of Gallion, but
suggests the case here is not within Gallion's purview.
Gallion struck down in part Utah Code Ann.

§

58-37-4

(1953),

as amended, which authorized the Attorney General, in effect,
the power to define a crime and to designate the penalty
therefor. Id. at 685.
Unlike the statute in Gallion, the habitual
criminal statutes, Section 76-8-1001 and 1002, define the
penalty and the procedures

for enforcement.

Unlike

Gallion, the prosecution has no power to define the crime
because the habitual criminal provision is not a criminal
offense; neither has the prosecution the power to designate
penalty because Section 76-8-1001 expressly requires
imprisonment from five years to life in the state prison.
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Similar challenges have been made against
habitual offender statutes with little success.

In

People v. Mock Don Yuen, 67 Cal.App. 597, 227 Pac. 948
(1924), the Court rejected defendant's claim that the
statute was unconstitutional or an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because a second or subsequent
offense could not be punished as a felony unless the
indictment or information charged a previous conviction.
State v. Anderson, 12 Wash.App. 171, 528 P.2d 1003 (1974):
the defendant's claim of improper delegation of authority
was struck down.

See also State v. Williams, 9 Wash.App.

622, 513 P.2d 854 (1973).

Accord, Wrlwording v. State,

438 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Mo. 1969):
"
• The fact that a prosecuting
attorney has total discretion to charge
under the Act is a legislative
delegation of duty as a proper administrative function of that office."
Although the issue appears to be of first
impression in Utah, other jurisdictions have considered
the validity of the legislative delegation in authorizing
prosecutorial discretion under their habitual criminal
statutes.

The jurisdictions almost unanimously agree in

upholding the delegation.

Sections 76-8-1001 and 1002 do

not permit unbridled discretion as in the State v. Gallion
statute.
76-8-1001.

The penalty is clearly fixed under Section
It is the trier of fact, not the prosecutor,
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who determines whether a person is an habitual criminal
under the 1975 statute.

Respondent submits this habitual

criminal statute is a constitutionally permissible
delegation of legislative authority.
POINT II
THE IDENTITY OF THE APPELLANT WAS NOT PROPERLY
WITHIN THE TYPE OF COHMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGED UNDER THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT
CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
When he realized that appellant was asking him
to participate in a criminal act, Attorney Robert Van Sciver
informed appellant he planned to tell the police about the
checks.

Appellant does not dispute the propriety of this

disclosure.

His only complaint concerns Mr. Van Sciver's

court-ordered disclosure of appellant's identity.
Communications between attorney and client are
protected to encourage the client to fully disclose his
problems and circumstances to his lawyer so that he
may receive better legal service.
in Utah Code Ann.

§

78-24-8 (2)

This policy is embodied

(1953), as amended, in

Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility of the
ABA, and in the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 26:
"Subject to Rule 37 and except
as otherwise provided by Paragraph 2
of this rule communications found by
the judge to have been between lawyer
and his client in the course of that
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client has a privilege (a) if he is
the witness to refuse to disclose any
such communication, and (b) to prevent
his lawyer from disclosing it, and (c)
to prevent any other witness from disclosing such communication if it came
to the knowledge of such witness (i)
in the course of its transmittal between
the client and the lawyer, or (ii) in
a manner not reasonably to be anticipated
by the client, or (iii) as a result of
a breach of the lawyer-client relationship.
The privilege may be claimed by the client
in person or by his lawyer, or if
incompetent, by his guardian, or if
deceased, by his personal representative.
The privilege available to a corporation
or association terminates upon
dissolution."
An exception exists to this rule, which the prosecution
showed in the case at bar negatived any privilege.

Rule

26(2) reads:
"Exceptions. Such privileges
shall not extend (a) to a communication
if the judge finds that sufficient
evidence, aside from the communication,
has been introduced to warrant a finding
that the legal service was sought or
obtained in order to enable or aid the
client to commit or plan to commit a
crime or a tort • • • • "
The record reveals considerable evidence that
appellant sought out Mr. Van Sciver to carry his criminal
scheme to fruition.

The physical evidence of the checks

is the best indication of the criminal character of the
.

.

actl.Vl.ty.

1

1

Appellant makes reference to a hearing on his motion to
suppress. The transcript of that hearing was in the
possession of appellant at the time this brief was filed.
Respondent will submit an addendum to its brief which will
discuss the hearing on the motion to suppress for the
benefit of the court when the transcript of the hearing
Sponsored
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The communications uttered between appellant
and Mr. Van Sciver which included the appellant's identity,
are not privileged for several additional reasons:
1.

Rule 26(3) of the Utah Rules of Evidence

defines "client" as:
" • • • a person or corporation
or other association that, directly
or through an authorized representative,
consults a lawyer· or the lawyer's
representative for the purpose of
retaining the lawyer or securing legal
service or advice from him in his
professional capac1ty; and includes
an incompetent whose guardian so consults
the lawyer or the lawyer's representative
in behalf of the incompetent.
n
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant was not a client for purposes of this transaction
because he did not consult Mr. Van Sciver for the purpose
of retaining him or securing legal service or advice from
him in his professional capacity.

The appellant did not

want legal advice in this case; he merely wanted Mr. Van
Sciver to act as a go-between, an agent, for purposes of
exchanging the checks for the extortion money.
on Evidence,

§

McCormick

88, p. 179, says that the privilege for

communications hinges upon the client's belief that he is
consulting a lawyer in his capacity as a lawyer, and on his
manifested intention to seek professional legal advice.
Further, if the attorney is acting as an agent, the
consultation is not privileged nor is the statement
privileged.

Banks v. United States, 204 F.2d 666 (8th
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Cir.

1953).

Because appellant had employed Mr. VanSciver

in other, unrelated, civil matters, does not make him a
client in every situation, nor does it make every
communication between them privileged.

The mere fact

that the reltionship of attorney and client exists
between two individuals does not ipso facto make all
communications between them confidential.
~~

Evans v.

8 Utah 2d 26, 327 P.2d 260 (1958).
2.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 26(3) (b),

defines "communication" as follows:
" • • • [it] includes advice
given by the lawyer in7the course
of representing the client and
includes disclosures of the client
to a representative, associate or
employee of the lawyer incidental
to the professional relationship."
In the case at bar Mr. Van Sciver cannot be said to have
given any advice to the appellant

that would not be

exempted from the privilege under the criminal activity
exception, with the possible exception of his calling
the appellant the second time at his job to tell him not
to try to go through with his plan because the police
had the checks (Tr.68,69).

The disclosures by the appellant

cannot be said to be "incidental to the professional
relationship" because there was no professional relationship.
The attorney was sought only to act as a go-between in an
extortion plot.
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3.

Appellant also waived any privilege he

might have had by discussing the matter and appearing
personally in front of third persons.

Rule 37, Utah

Rules of Evidence, permits the holder of the privilege
to waive an otherwise privileged communication.

In

the instant case, appellant contacted not only Mr. Van
Sciver, but also Gilbert Athay (Tr.38).

Moreover, when

the appellant brought the checks to Van Sciver's office,
Randall Gaither was present for at least some of the
conversation between Van Sciver and the appellant.

Mr.

Gaither was not appellant's lawyer, and was, for the
purposes of the communication, a thirq party.

If matters

communicated to the attorney are revealed to third persons,
the element of confidentiality is destroyed.

Eg. Clayton

v. Canida, 223 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
4.

This Court has upheld the rule which allows

a client to prevent the disclosure of information which he
has given to his attorney in order to secure legal assistanc1
Nevertheless, this Court has also held that the privilege
should be strictly construed in accordance with its
objective.

Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corporation, 27

Utah 2d 310, 495 P.2d 1254, 1257 (1972).

In light of this,

appellant in the present case should not be able to claim
privilege as to his identity when he was unable to claim
privilege as to his conduct.
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The object of the criminality exception to the
privilege is to remove the protection from conduct which
contravenes the promotion of the administration of justice.
Respondent submits that strict construction in accordance
with this object requires upholding disclosure of appellant's
identity.
5.

Finally, appellant cites State v. Olwell,

64 Wash.2d 828, 394 P.2d 681, 16 A.L.R.3d 1021 (1964); Baird
v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960); Ex parte McDonough,
170 Cal. 230, 149 Pac. 566 (1951); and In re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d
214, 168 N.E.2d 660 (1960), as authority for his position that
Mr. Van Sciver's disclosure of his identity was improper.
While these cases do in a general way give support for
broadening the privilege to include the identity of the
client, the great weight of authority denies the privilege
in these cases.

McCormick on Evidence, § 90, p. 185, and

authorities cited therein.

Whether or not to extend the

privilege depends on the balance of conflicting policies.
One of the policies considered is protection of the public
interest.

The court in In re Kaplan, supra, upheld an attorney's

right to not disclose his client's name where he had previously
disclosed the subject matter of his client's communication.
The court noted that the public interest was served by the
client's exposure of wrongdoing committed by others and
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in Kaplan had not committed any criminal act but feared

reprisal from those whom he had exposed.

Applying

Kaplan's reasoning to the case at bar, the public has
an interest in exposing the perpetrator of criminal
conduct.

Appellant was not benefitting the public

interest by attempting to use an attorney as a go-between
in an extortion plot.
from his scheme.

He expected to personally profit

Unlke the communicant in Kaplan, who

was not personally involved in criminal activity,
appellant did not serve the public interest through his
communications; rather, he hoped to serve his own interests.
The public interest in the case at bar required disclosure
of appellant's identity.
The communications of appellant which include
his identity do not qualify as privileged under any one
of several rationales.

Appellant attempted to hide behind

the privilege to avoid detection for his criminal activities,
he abused the relationship with Hr. Van Sciver under the
cloak of seeking legal advice, and he himself waived any
possible privilege he might have had by discussing the
transaction with third parties, individuals with whom
appellant does not allege any confidential relationship.
In sum, the identity of the appellant was not properly
within the type of communications privileged under the
attorney-client relationship, and therefore the trial court
corrected denied his motion to suppress.
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POINT III
APPELLANT'S VOLUNTARY CONFESSION WAS LAWFULLY
INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE.
After appellant was arrested he was taken to
the County Attorney's Office and informed of his rights.
He then voluntarily confessed to his criminal involvement.

Appellant contends by extended syllogism that:
1.

Because Mr. Van Sciver improperly disclosed

his identity, appellant was arrested.
2.

Because his arrest was allegedly unlawful,

his confession should have been suppressed.
3.

Because his confession was not suppressed,

his constitutional rights have impliedly been denied him.
Appellant cites Wong Sun v. United States, 371

u.s.

471 (1963), and Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975),

in support of his causal chain.

For Wong Sun to apply,

evidence must be obtained as a result of an arrest.

This

threshold consideration has not been satisfactorily met
because appellant cannot show the disclosure of his identity
was improper.

The privilege under the attorney-client

relationship is a privilege.

It is not a right.

The

appellant acted inconsistently with one who is entitled
to the privilege, as discussed,

~'

and he lost it.

Assuming, arguendo, that he did not lose the
privilege and that his arrest was illegal, whether the
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Brown v. Illinois, supra, requires more than a Hiranda
warning to attenuate the taint of unconstitutional arrest.
Under Brown, the Miranda warning is an important factor
in determining whether the confession was obtained by
exploitation of an illegal arrest, but temporal proximity
of the arrest and the confession, presence of intervening
ci;rcumstances, and "particularly, the purpose and flagrancy
of the official misconduct," id.at 604, are all relevant.
Admittedly, in the instant case, not much time lapsed
between appellant's arrest and his confession and no
intervening circumstances exist to

br~ak

the causal chain.

However, the two factors emphasized by the United States
Supreme Court as the most signficant:

the existence of

the Miranda warning and the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct,distinguish the case at bar.
1.

The record reveals appellant was given a

thorough review of his rights and that he waived his
rights guaranteed him under Miranda.

When he did indicate

he wished to talk with a lawyer, the questioning abruptly
ended.

See Transcript of Statement, Record: 36-41.

The

appellant does not complain of irregularity as to his
Miranda rights.
2.

The propriety of Mr. Van Sciver's conduct,

if resolved in favor of extending appellant's privilege,
would have to be a borderline decision at best.

One
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was not privileged.

Under the authority and reasoning

cited in Point II of this brief, it appears a majority
of jurisdictions would not extend the privilege to
include appellant's identity, particularly in view of
the public interest opposing protection.

The case at

bar clearly does not illustrate misdirected and flagrant
official misconduct.

If it would be found that Mr.

Van Sciver improperly revealed appellant's identity,
this determination would reflect reasonable error in
judgment.

Further, the purpose of the official conduct

would have been to benefit the public interest by
identifying and apprehending an individual involved in
criminal conduct.

Under

~'

therefore, appellant's

confession would withstand an illegal arrest because the
two major factors in determining voluntariness would be
satisfactorily met.
Respondent submits, therefore, that whether
Mr. Van Sciver properly or improperly revealed appellant's
identity, his confession was clearly voluntary under
Wong Sun and Brown standards.

Because appellant's

confession was voluntary, it was properly admitted into
evidence.
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CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing reasons and authority,
respondent urges this Court to affirm the findings of the
jury and court below.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOI'I
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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